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RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Issue
Has Santiago failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a
unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed, upon his guilty plea to possession of
heroin?

Santiago Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
On November 18, 2017, Santiago drove while he was “under the influence of ‘heroin and

pot’” and while his driver’s license was suspended. (PSI, pp.3-4, 64-66. 1) An officer stopped
Santiago for driving a vehicle that “had a cancelled registration,” learned that Santiago had an
outstanding warrant for his arrest out of California, and asked him to step out of the vehicle.
(PSI, pp.65-66.) The officer’s “narcotic detection canine” subsequently alerted on the vehicle,
after which the officer found – attached to Santiago’s keychain, “which was still hanging from
the key in the ignition” – a “cylindrical container” with “a green leafy substance” wrapped in
plastic, “a black tar substance” (that tested “presumptively positive for heroin”) wrapped in
plastic, and “several more pieces of plastic which appeared to have only residue that matched the
presumptive heroin that was located.” (PSI, pp.66-67.) Officers also located “several other drug
paraphernalia items,” including – on Santiago’s person – a “screwdriver that had a small amount
of what appeared to be heroin residue as well as a folded receipt which contained a piece of
plastic with what appeared to be more residue.” (PSI, pp.64, 67.)
The state charged Santiago with possession of heroin and possession of drug
paraphernalia. (R., pp.25-26.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Santiago pled guilty to possession
of heroin and the state dismissed the remaining charge and agreed to recommend probation with
an underlying unified sentence of seven years, with three years fixed. (R., pp.53-54, 63-64.) At
sentencing, the state made recommendations consistent with the plea agreement, and Santiago’s
counsel “concur[red]” with the state’s recommendations. (3/22/18 Tr., p.19, Ls.3-9; p.21, Ls.12.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with only two years fixed,
suspended the sentence, and placed Santiago on supervised probation. (R., pp.79-86.) Santiago
filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.87-89.)
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PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “Santiago 46031
psi.pdf.”
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Santiago asserts his underlying sentence is excessive in light of his character and his
claims that he “did not pose any danger to the officer or the public at any time” and that his
sentence is “not necessary to protect the public interest.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-5.) There are
two reasons why Santiago’s argument fails. First, Santiago requested the sentence he received
and is therefore precluded by the invited error doctrine from challenging the sentence on appeal.
Second, even if this Court reviews the merits of Santiago’s claims, he has failed to establish that
the district court abused its discretion by imposing an underlying unified sentence of seven years,
with two years fixed.
A party is estopped, under the doctrine of invited error, from complaining that a ruling or
action of the trial court that the party invited, consented to or acquiesced in was error. State v.
Castrejon, 163 Idaho 19, 21, 407 P.3d 606, 608 (Ct. App. 2017) (review denied Jan. 4, 2018)
(citations omitted). This doctrine applies to sentencing decisions as well as to rulings during
trial. Id. The purpose of the invited error doctrine is to prevent a party who caused or played an
important role in prompting a trial court to take a certain action from later challenging that action
on appeal. Id. at 22, 407 P.3d at 609 (citing State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240, 985 P.2d 117,
120 (1999)).
At sentencing, consistent with the plea agreement in this case, the state recommended
probation with an underlying unified sentence of seven years, with three years fixed. (3/22/18
Tr., p.19, Ls.3-9; R., pp.63-64.) Santiago’s counsel subsequently stated, “Judge, I concur and
ask you to place [Santiago] on probation.” (3/22/18 Tr., p.21, Ls.1-2.) The district court granted
the request and imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with only two years fixed, suspended
the sentence, and placed Santiago on probation. (R., pp.79-86.) Because Santiago received a
lesser underlying sentence than the one the parties jointly recommended, he cannot claim on
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appeal that the sentence is excessive. Therefore, Santiago’s claim of an abuse of sentencing
discretion is barred by the doctrine of invited error and his sentence should be affirmed.
Even if this Court considers the merits of Santiago’s claim, he has still failed to establish
an abuse of discretion. When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the
entire length of the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho
1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008).
It is presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant’s probable term of
confinement. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 687, 391 (2007). Where a sentence
is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse
of discretion. McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citations omitted). To carry this
burden the appellant must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.
Id. A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of
protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or
retribution. Id. The district court has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them
differing weights when deciding upon the sentence. Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State v. Moore,
131 Idaho 814, 825, 965 P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (court did not abuse its discretion in concluding
that the objectives of punishment, deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for
rehabilitation). “In deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a
reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d
at 628 (quoting Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27). Furthermore, “[a] sentence
fixed within the limits prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of
discretion by the trial court.” Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324
(1982)).
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The maximum prison sentence for possession of heroin is seven years.

I.C. § 37-

2732(c)(1). Santiago’s underlying unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed, falls
well within the statutory guidelines. (R., pp.79-86.) Furthermore, his sentence is appropriate in
light of his lengthy history of criminal offending and abusing illegal drugs, his failure to
rehabilitate or be deterred despite numerous prior treatment opportunities and legal sanctions, his
lack of amenability to substance abuse treatment, and the risk he presents to the community.
Santiago, now 53 years of age, has been engaging in criminal behavior for more than 40
years. (PSI, pp.1, 4-7, 13-14.) He reported that he began using illegal drugs when he was 10
years old, and was using heroin, cocaine, marijuana, and “other hallucinogens” by the time he
was 18. (PSI, pp.13-14.) His criminal record dates back to 1983, when he was charged with
being under the influence of a controlled substance, and he has since incurred convictions for
possession of drug paraphernalia, disorderly conduct, resisting/obstructing an officer, operating a
vehicle without the owner’s consent, failure to provide insurance, grand theft, burglary,
misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance, a prior conviction for felony possession of a
controlled substance, possession of heroin with intent to deliver, and seven separate convictions
for driving without privileges. (PSI, pp.4-7, 78, 109.) Santiago has previously participated in
the retained jurisdiction program twice, he has been granted opportunities on both probation and
parole, and he has served several stints in prison. (PSI, pp.4-8, 77.) He has also been afforded
substance abuse treatment through the Port of Hope, Intermountain Hospital, AA/NA, and
“staying in a recovery home or sanctuary”; he nevertheless continues to use illegal substances
and commit crimes. (PSI, pp.3-4, 25, 79.)
On appeal, Santiago claims that he “did not pose any danger to the officer or the public at
any time” when he committed the instant offense, and that his sentence is “not necessary to
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protect the public interest.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.3, 5.) To the contrary, Santiago admitted that,
when he committed the instant offense – during which he was driving an unregistered vehicle,
with a canister of heroin attached to his keychain, while his driving privileges were suspended –
he was “under the influence of ‘heroin and pot’” “‘with the intent to induce more upon
[him]self.’” (PSI, pp.4, 65-66.) Driving while under the influence of heroin and marijuana
clearly poses a danger to the public. Furthermore, Santiago persisted in violating the law for
several months after he committed the instant offense, by continuing to drive without privileges
and by continuing to possess and use marijuana, methamphetamine, and Norco (for which he did
not have a prescription), until he was finally incarcerated without bond. (PSI, pp.7, 13-14; R.,
pp.50-51, 54.) Despite this, and despite admitting that he “has tried to stop using drugs but has
been unable to,” Santiago stated that “a drug treatment program is not necessary for him at this
time” and that “he has too many outside obligations to attend drug treatment.” (PSI, pp.14-15.)
The presentence investigator determined that Santiago poses a high risk to reoffend and
concluded that he “appears to be a very guarded candidate for an order of probation.” (PSI,
pp.16, 19.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed,
but suspended the sentence and granted Santiago the opportunity to successfully complete a
period of probation in this case. (R., pp.79-86.) Santiago’s underlying sentence is appropriate in
light of his ongoing substance abuse and criminal offending, his failure to rehabilitate or be
deterred despite numerous prior treatment opportunities and legal sanctions, his lack of
amenability to substance abuse treatment, and his high risk to reoffend. Given any reasonable
view of the facts, Santiago has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.
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Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Santiago’s conviction and sentence.

DATED this 14th day of January, 2019.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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Paralegal
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